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1. When Governor Sheng Shih-tsai abandoned his pro-Soviet policy in the fall of 1943 and requested that his Soviet advisors leave the province, the Soviets forced all the White Russians who had accepted Soviet citizenship to move from seven of the ten regions of Sinkiang into the three northwestern regions of Ili, Tarbagatai and Altai. Most of the White Russian youth were ultimately removed to the USSR. Thus, the once large White Russian community in Urumchi diminished to a mere handful of extreme anti-Communists.
2. Among the many White Russians who were taken to the USSR, three were later returned by the Soviets to play major roles in the separation of the three northwestern regions of Ili, Tarbagatai and Altai from the rest of Sinkiang and in the establishment of the pro-Soviet East Turkestan People's Republic hereafter referred to as ETPEP.

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3. In September 1944 [redacted] 17 other Sinkiang youths, all having been trained by [redacted] in Tashkent, returned to Sinkiang and settled in Talki, a small town not far from Kuldja. Their return from the Soviet Union did not cause any great concern in local Chinese government circles, or among the White Russians, because they gave very logical reasons for returning. They said that life in the USSR was not what they had expected it to be, therefore when the first opportunity presented itself they escaped and returned to the land of their birth. From Talki these youth, all knowing not only the Russian and Chinese languages but also the local dialects of the Turkic tongue, were able to recruit, with the financial help of the Soviet Consul in Kuldja, a large number of Kazakhs who were willing to participate in the forthcoming revolt.

4. [redacted] the well coordinated "revolt", which was conceived and engineered by the Soviets, began. [redacted] his men were joined by [redacted] another group of Soviet-trained local Russians. [redacted] between Talki and Kuldja. This combined group, [redacted] stole into Kuldja, armed the Kazakhs who had been assigned [redacted] and commenced to attack the Chinese garrison which was stationed in the compound of the local military headquarters. At the precise moment that the firing started a fully-armed Soviet Army motorcycle corps entered Kuldja and proceeded directly to the compound of the Soviet Consulate, which adjoins the Chinese military headquarters. It was later learned that this Soviet Army motorcycle corps was sent to assist in the revolt, if the initial stages of the revolt did not go in the favor of the [redacted] group. It turned out that they were not needed and therefore they rumbled out of Kuldja at dawn of the next day.

5. By morning [redacted] this group of Russians and Kazakhs had secured all of Kuldja with the exception of the compound occupied by the Chinese garrison. These Chinese troops held out for two days. Meanwhile, the Kazakhs, under [redacted] direction, recruited other Moslems who as a group have always been resentful of Chinese rule and who, because of their ever-increasing nationalistic fervor, could always be counted upon to use to the ever-popular Sinkiang battle cry of "Don't bow to the Chinese minority, rise and rule yourselves". It must be noted here that the Moslems did not support [redacted] because of his political affiliation for they, until it was too late to turn back, did not realize that the Soviets were behind this revolt. They blindly and trustingly joined, being told that the sole objective of the revolt was to convert Sinkiang into an independent Moslem state.

6. On the second day of the revolt a Soviet division, commanded by an officer who called himself Aleksandrov and whose military rank was never learned, entered Kuldja, joined [redacted] forces and annihilated the remnants of the Chinese garrison. This Aleksandrov was the same man who commanded the Soviet forces in Sinkiang in 1934, in the war against the Moslems who were led by General Ma Chun-ying. During that campaign, however, he called himself Yastilov.

He proclaimed to the Moslems of Kuldja that he and his troops were there to help in their struggle for the establishment of an autonomous Moslem state and requested them to join in the forthcoming military campaign. He further promised that those who joined his forces "would spend the coming summer in Urumschi". Thus, his ranks were swelled with Moslems, who Aleksandrov armed with Soviet weapons. Several days later, Aleksandrov moved out of Kuldja in the direction of Shikho and Manass to continue the war of "liberating" Sinkiang from Chinese rule. His forces consisted of the Soviet Division and an equal number of local Moslem recruits.

7. Prior to Aleksandrov's departure from Kuldja he appointed Gani Bator, a local bandit who was freed from a Chinese prison, military governor of the "liberated" territory. It was also learned [redacted]

[redacted] that their secret objective was to separate Sinkiang from the rest of China and to set up the Uighur Soviet Socialist Republic in its place. The Uighur race comprises approximately 78% of the total population of Sinkiang. Shortly after Aleksandrov left Kuldja, Orbenkin and Lankin, a Soviet Colonel, arrived from the USSR and assumed their prearranged duties as Minister of Trade

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and Minister of Health, respectively. Gribenkin's first official act as Minister of Trade was to issue a proclamation to all the merchants ordering that they no longer operate as individuals, or firms, but organize into a cooperative system of share-holding associations. He further ordered that a certain percentage of the employees of each cooperative must be Moslem women and that they, the Moslem women, must work without wearing veils over their faces. These orders, especially the latter, infuriated the Moslem merchants, since their religion prescribes that the woman's place is in the home and that veils must be worn when they are in the presence of men, other than their husbands. The Moslems, however, soon realized that they had been tricked into supporting a group which they now found themselves powerless to resist.

8. Under the command of Aleksandrov the Moslem and Soviet troops were successful in quickly driving the Chinese out of the Ili, Tarbagatai and Altai Regions. The Chinese troops, however, were able to regroup and hold their line along the Manass River. A stalemate developed and both sides hesitated to break it. The Chinese realizing who their real opponent was and the Soviets not wishing to enlarge the war and thus attract world attention to their newest exploit. Furthermore, the Soviets realized that they had recaptured, for their full exploitation, the richest portion of Sinkiang. On 2 Jan 45, both sides agreed to negotiate for a peaceful settlement of the war. The ETPR negotiators were all either Soviets, or Soviet-trained local Moslems and Russians. When the negotiations began, Aleksandrov and his troops withdrew from Sinkiang leaving many of his officers to train and command the ETPR National Army. The ETPR was formally proclaimed to be a separate state in the fall of 1945.
9. On 6 Jun 46, a peace treaty was signed between ETPR and the Chinese Nationalist Government. In this treaty, the Chinese Government recognized the separation of the Ili, Tarbagatai and Altai Regions from Sinkiang and the establishment of the Moslem state of ETPR. It was further agreed that the Sinkiang-ETPR border was to run along the Manass River. With the signing of this peace treaty, Gani Bator, the temporary military governor of ETPR, and all other wealthy and influential Moslems were forcibly removed to the USSR and a new set of officials were appointed to rule over ETPR. Rumor had it that Gani Bator and the other Moslems who were taken to the USSR were liquidated, as the Soviets often do when persons outlive their usefulness to them. Most of the new appointees were either Soviets, Soviet Moslems, or local Russians who had been politically indoctrinated and trained by the Soviets. The new top-level appointees were:
 - a. President: Alihan Tura, a Soviet Uighur from Tashkent
 - b. Minister of Trade: Giorgiy Mikhailovich Gribenkin
 - c. Minister of War: Ivan Giorgievich Palinov
 - d. Minister of Interior: Moakalay, or Moaharoy, a Colonel in the Soviet Army
 - e. Minister of Health: Leskin, a Colonel in the Soviet Army
10. The domestic policy of the ETPR was first to turn all Moslems against the Chinese, to fill them full of nationalism and hate for the Chinese. Then, with the appointment of Soviet Moslems, or Soviet-trained local Russians, the trade and life in ETPR was tied to the economy and political life of the USSR. The actual movement of goods was mostly in one direction, toward the USSR. The Soviets after throwing off Chinese rule over this area and imposing their own, through the use of their appointees who filled all important civil and military posts, forced the ETPR to send most of its products to the USSR as payment for the military aid given by the Soviet Union during the revolt and subsequent fighting. The goods that were sent to the USSR, from ETPR, consisted mostly of various types of furs, hides, casings, horses, cattle, grains, etc. The Soviets were also permitted to resume their full exploitation of the rich natural resources of the area, including various strategic minerals and petroleum. In return, the USSR sent all types of machinery, technicians and instructors and small quantities of cloth and military equipment. Soviet Army officers not only trained but commanded the National Army of the ETPR. They wore National Army uniforms when with their troops, but when away from their troops and on special occasions, they did wear their Soviet Army uniforms.

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11. The secret police apparatus of the ETPR was very highly developed, probably more so than under Governor Sheng Shih-tsai in Sinkiang. Their methods and the resulting mass imprisonment, torture and death was parallel to what occurred in Sinkiang under Governor Sheng . . . The headquarters of the secret police was in Kuldja and was officially known as House No. 2 (Dom Nomer Dva). What significance this name had, no one seemed to know. It was a large private home which was guarded and staffed entirely by Soviet Army personnel. Orders and individuals emanating from "House No. 2" had priority over all other departments and high offices. It seemed to be the highest power in ETPR and was frequently visited by groups of high-ranking Soviet Army officers from the USSR.
12. The mysterious deaths of some 30 top ETPR officials in September 1949 was brought about by the Soviets to prevent them from hurting Sino-Soviet relations. The Soviets, through these officials, had pursued a policy of instilling in the Moslem population a strong hatred for Chinese people and Chinese rule, making no distinction between the Chinese Communists and Chinese Nationalists. They had also promised the people that they would back them up in maintaining ETPR as an independent Moslem state. Then, when the Sinkiang Chinese officials on 29 Sep 49 made a formal declaration of adherence to the Communists and the first contingents of the Chinese Communist Army entered Hami in October 1949, the Soviets were faced with a serious problem. The Chinese Communists let it be known that they intended to occupy all of Sinkiang, including the three northwestern regions which make up ETPR, whereas the officials and people of ETPR were as determined to maintain their independence of China. To avert a clash between the Chinese Communist Army and that of ETPR, the Soviets placed all of the influential officials on ETPR on a plane, supposedly bound for a conference with the Chinese Communists. This plan was purposely caused to crash shortly after its take off in Kuldja, thus eliminating all of the local personalities who might have interfered with the peaceful occupation of ETPR by the Chinese Communist Army.
13. Although the Chinese Communists retained Burchan Shahidi as Governor of Sinkiang, after the 29 Sep 49 defection of Sinkiang officials to the Communist side and up to the time of my departure from Sinkiang in October 1950, the following three Soviets were the real power in Sinkiang. They were:
 - a. Ramintov, Soviet Consul-General in Urumchi
 - b. Grolin, Secretary of the Turkestan Branch of the Communist Party
 - c. Nikolai, Soviet Consul in Kuldja.

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